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Abstract—Due to the lack of quantitative information and
for cost-efficiency, most risk assessment methods use partially
ordered values (e.g. high, medium, low) as risk indicators.
In practice it is common to validate risk indicators by
asking stakeholders whether they make sense. This way of
validation is subjective, thus error prone. If the metrics are
wrong (not meaningful), then they may lead system owners
to distribute security investments inefficiently. For instance,
in an extended enterprise this may mean over investing in
service level agreements or obtaining a contract that provides
a lower security level than the system requires. Therefore, when
validating risk assessment methods it is important to validate
the meaningfulness of the risk indicators that they use. In this
paper we investigate how to validate the meaningfulness of
risk indicators based on measurement theory. Furthermore, to
analyze the applicability of the measurement theory to risk
indicators, we analyze the indicators used by a risk assessment
method specially developed for assessing confidentiality risks
in networks of organizations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IT risk metrics are designed to monitor, analyze and man-
age risk related attributes of system entities, e.g. impact of
unauthorized disclosure of a certain information asset. Risk
experts commonly measure these attributes with partially
ordered values (e.g. high, medium, low). This is due to the
unavailability of sufficient and complete event data or to the
need to be cost-efficient. To determine risk, risk assessment
methods aggregate these values with merge operators. We
call merge operator a qualitative ordering over each possible
measurement combination. We furthermore call the values
aggregated with merge operators risk indicators. Risk indi-
cators are also partially ordered values.
In practice, risk indicators are validated by asking stake-
holders’ commitment. This way of validation is based on
subjective opinion of stakeholders, but not on analysis
of meaningfulness of the indicators. If risk indicators are
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not meaningful, they may mislead system owners at their
security investment decisions. For instance, in an extended
enterprise this may mean over investing in service level
agreements or obtaining a contract that provides a lower
security level than the system requires. Therefore, it is
important to validate the meaningfulness of the risk indi-
cators, by validating a risk assessment method. Validating
the meaningfulness of the risk indicators mean testing the
meaningfulness of each indicator (construct validity) and
of each merge operator that is used to aggregate indicators
(aggregation validity).
Testing the construct validity and aggregation validity
of checklist-based methods is usually trivial. However, as
the complexity of a risk assessment method increases, the
number of risk indicators and merge operations increases
as well. Consequently, validating the meaningfulness of the
risk indicators that sophisticated RA methods use becomes
challenging.
The goal of this paper is to investigate how to validate
the meaningfulness of risk indicators and merge operators
based on measurement theory. In particular, the following
two questions will be investigated: (Q1) Is measurement
theory applicable to a usability critical field such as risk as-
sessment? and (Q2) Is measurement theory based validation
of risk indicators repeatable?
In this paper we present a road map for validating the
meaningfulness of risk indicators. We furthermore analyze
the applicability of the measurement theory to risk indicators
by testing the indicator used by CRAC++ [8]. CRAC++ is a
sophisticated risk assessment method, which we developed
specially for assessing confidentiality risks at networks of
organizations.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section II we
present the concepts of the measurement theory that are
relevant for validation of risk indicators; in SectionIII we
present a road map for validating the meaningfulness of risk
indicators and merge operators; in SectionIV we follow this
road map for validating the risk indicators of CRAC++; in
SectionV we briefly present the fields in which measurement
theory is applied for validation purposes, as well as the re-
lated approaches in risk management field; in SectionVI we
conclude by answering the research questions and provide
some future work.
II. MEASUREMENT THEORY
In this section we are going to present concepts of the
measurement theory that we refer to throughout the paper.
These concepts are introduced by Fenton and Pfleeger [2] ,
Kitchenhamm et al. [5], and Herrmann [4].
A metric is a value that results from measuring a certain
attribute of an entity being investigated. Therefore from here
on we refer to it as measurement. It facilitates non-subjective
decision making and improves performance through time
efficient mapping of value to scales.
By defining measurements it is essential to distinguish
between entities and attributes [4]. An entity is a logical or
physical object, such as an application or a work station, or
an event, such as an incident. An attribute on the other hand
is a feature of an entity, such as the impact of an incident.
Measurement are classified in four main scale types:
nominal scale; ordinal scale; interval scale; and ratio scale.
Scale types define the arithmetic operations one can use to
analyze values that are mapped to certain scales. These scale
types and their properties are presented in Table I.
Table I
CLASSES OF MEASUREMENT SCALES.
Scale Type preserve
order
magnitude possible arith-
metic opera-
tions
Nominal scale no no non
Ordinal scale yes monotonic in-
creasing
non
Interval scale yes positive linear +,-
Ratio scale yes positive
geometric
+,-,*,/
A nominal scale defines a classification schema that
consist of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cate-
gories. There is no order among these categories, therefore
none of the possible arithmetic operations are applicable to
the measurements from this scale. The measurements that
belong to this scale are referred to as categorial variables.
This type of scale can be used for instance to categorize
attackers according to their capabilities.
An ordinal scale allows arranging the variable categories
in sequences with a monotonically increasing magnitude,
therefore it is referred to as ordinal variables. However
there is no precise information on the magnitude of the
differences between these variables. Therefore, arithmetic
operations are still not applicable to attributes belong to
this scale. Most of the risk measurements, such as criticality
of an IT-component classified as marginal–minor–moderate–
catastrophic, belong to this scale.
An interval scale extends the ordinal scale by indicat-
ing the exact differences. The magnitude of the difference
among the variables of this scale is positive linear. Ac-
cordingly, addition and subtraction are permitted arithmetic
operation among the variables. The measurements that be-
long to this scale are refereed to as interval variables. Risk
indicators for which quantitative information is available
(such as number of IT-components, number of instances of
an information asset, and business impact of an incident)
belong to this scale.
A ratio scale extends the interval scale by allowing to
capture positive and negative values. The magnitude between
the variable categories of this scale are positive geometric.
All arithmetic operations are permitted among the variables
of this scale.
Herrmann [4] differentiates among three types of mea-
surements: ratio, proportion, and percentage. A ratio mea-
surement (different from ratio scale) compares two quantities
that are from distinct populations and are mutually exclusive.
If they are from the same population then the measurement
is from type proportion. Percentage converts proportion to
term of per hundred units.
Herrmann [4] argues that to prevent subjectivity all
measurements should be collected according to the same
quantification process. Fenton and Pfleeger [2] differentiate
between two kinds of quantifications processes: direct quan-
tification and calculation.
Direct quantification assigns values to attributes of entities
directly, e.g. quantifying the number of incidents. This way
it maps the facts of the empirical world to the indicators
of the formal world. Whereas, calculation is an indirect
quantification, which involves aggregating several attributes
of an entity, to gain new knowledge on that entity. For
instance to provide additional knowledge “expected impact
of an incident” on entity “impact”, one may aggregated the
penalties to be paid, recovery costs and image loss.
Kitchenham et al. [5] argue that for a measurement to
be meaningful the correlation among the facts should be
preserved also among the indicators, and no other operations
of scales than the permitted ones should be performed on
indicators. The first one is called construct validity and the
second one is called aggregation validity.
Furthermore, there are four key characteristics that a
construct should obey to be meaningful: accuracy; precision;
completeness; and correctness. Accuracy shows how well
individual or average measurements agree with a the true
value. Repeatability of accurate measures are captured with
precision. In other words, precision shows how well iden-
tically performed measurements agree with each other, or
how small the variance is. Precision analyzes the variabilities
in the test environment, such as human error or inattention
to detail. Completeness analyzes whether a measurement
measures what it is intended to measure. It depends on the
completeness and coherence of the measurement process.
Finally, correctness analyzes if the data is collected exactly
as it is described by the method. The more formal a
measurement process is defined the more correct results it
delivers.
III. VALIDATION ROAD MAP
In this section we present a road map for validating
the meaningfulness of the risk indicators of complex risk
assessment methods. The road map consists of the following
three steps. In the following we describe the activities of
each validation step.
Step 1: Eliciting information: The aim of this step is to
elicit a list of entities, a list of attributes of these entities (risk
indicators) that the RA method measures, and the merge
operators with which the RA method “calculate” some of
the indicators.
Step 2: Analyzing Construct Validity: The aim of this
step is to analyze the meaningfulness of risk indicators that
are identified in step 1. In this step we first determine to
which scale type (i.e. nominal scale, ordinal scale, interval
scale and ratio scale) each indicator belongs, then analyze
how well each risk indicator satisfies the key characteris-
tics of meaningful measurements (i.e. accuracy, precision,
validity and correctness).
Step 3: Analyzing Aggregation Validity: Finally we
analyze the meaningfulness of the merge operations that are
identified in Step 1. That is we identify possible arithmetic
operations each merge operator is allowed to use based on
the scale of the measurements that are aggregated.
Commonly risk is presented as a single value that is aggre-
gated of two entities, e.g. likelihood and impact. For instance
if two constructs are impact and likelihood with respective
construct measures high and medium, then applying a merge
operator to combine these two measures may define the
measurement of risk construct as high. A merge operator is
necessary because it is not possible to combine qualitative
values, which are incompatible, with arithmetical functions.
There is a partial order between qualitative values of each
construct measurement. This order needs to be respected by
defining merge operators. Accordingly by comparing two
risk values r1 = (l1, i1) and r2 = (l2, i2), we can say that
r1 is superior to r2 iff l1 > l2 and i1 > i2.
IV. APPLICATION
In this section we demonstrate how the three steps can be
applied to CRAC++ method.
A. Eliciting information from CRAC++
Based on the formalizations of CRAC++ we elicited 11
risk indicators (as presented in Table II) and two merge
operations.
Indicators I01, I02, I03, I04, I05 and I06 are direct quan-
tifications. I01, confidentiality value, indicates the business
criticality of entity information asset from the perspective of
the system owner. I02, number of instances, is the attribute
of entity information asset and measures the number of
Table II
RISK INDICATORS OF CRAC++
Indicator ID Attribute Entity
I01 confidentiality value information asset
I02 number of instances information asset
I03 homogeneity information asset
I04 number of capabilities threat agent
I05 number of conditions vulnerability
I06 level of mitigation countermeasures
I07 impact information asset
I08 total impact IT component
I09 ease of exploiting vulnerabilities vulnerability
I10 ease of accessing one component threat agent
I11 protection level of a component IT component
instances that belong to an information asset, e.g. if client
data is an information asset, and there are information
records that belongs to 100 clients, then number of instances
of client data is 100. I03, homogeneity, reflects the presence
of a correlation between the numbers of instances of an
information asset that gets disclosed by an incident and
the impact of the disclosure. For instance, “social security
numbers” are homogeneous, since the damage due to the
loss of one hundred social security numbers is larger than
the damage due to the loss of a single social security number.
Conversely, an information asset is nonhomogeneous if the
damage due to the disclosure of one instance is as big as
the damage of the disclosure of all instances. For instance,
if the login credentials of one user get disclosed, the damage
to the company is basically the same as if the credentials of
100 users with equal access rights would be disclosed. I04,
Number of capabilities, is the number of necessary attributes
(out of a predefined set of attributes, e.g. hacking skills and
physical access) that a threat agent is estimated to have. I05,
number of conditions, is the number of necessary attributes
(from the same set as in number of capabilities) to exploit
a certain vulnerability of IT architectural components. I06,
level of mitigation, is the level indicating how well a
countermeasure mitigates a vulnerability.
Impact (I07) and total impact (I08) are indirect quantifi-
cations (calculations) that are achieved by applying respec-
tively  merge operation on I01 and I02, and ⊕ merge
operation on two distinct variables of I07. I07, impact, is
the loss related with unauthorized disclosure of instances
of one information asset on an IT component. I08, total
impact, indicates the impact of accessing all information
assets available on an IT component.
Finally, risk indicators I09, I10 and I11 are direct quan-
tifications that are measured in relation to other measure-
ments. The measurement type of I09 and I10 is proportion,
and the measurement type of I11 is ratio. I09, ease of
exploiting vulnerabilities, indicates the ease of a potential
attacker exploiting a vulnerability. I10, ease of accessing
one component, is the likelihood of a threat agent disclosing
information assets on one component y exploiting the easiest
vulnerability. Finally, I11, protection level of a component
is how well an IT component is protected against the easies
unauthorized access.
B. Analyzing Construct validity of CRAC++
To analyze the construct validity of the CRAC++ method
we determining the scale type that each risk indicator
belongs to.
CRAC++ measures confidentiality value in terms of or-
dered variables (e.g. high - medium - low) and uses it to
rank the business criticality of information assets without
preserving the size of the interval between variables. Assum-
ing that information asset i1 is more business critical than
information asset i3. This relation is modelled at CRAC++
by representing the confidentiality value of information asset
i1 with ordinal variable high and the confidentiality value
of information asset i3 with the ordinal variable medium.
Confidentiality value is meaningful, because it preserves the
relationship that is observed among the facts.
In ideal case (when risk assessor has complete knowledge
on the information assets) number of instances belong to
interval scale. For cost-efficiency reasons we measure it with
ordinal scale.
Homogeneity consists of two mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive categories, homogenous and nonhomoge-
nous. Therefore, we say that it is of type nominal scale.
Capability and conditions are of nominal scale. Accord-
ingly, both number of capabilities and number of conditions
are from interval scale.
CRAC++ estimate level of mitigation with ordinal scale
values (e.g. 1/3 – 2/3 – 3/3). If there is a certain mitigation
mechanism in place that is recommended in best practices
then the mitigation level is 1/3, if there is a mitigation
mechanism that mitigates worse than the best practices rec-
ommend then the mitigation level is 2/3, else (no mitigation
mechanism in place) 3/3. The order of the entities reflect
the empirical mitigation level of the security mechanism but
does not preserve the size of the intervals.
CRAC++ determines impact by aggravating confidential-
ity value, number of instances and homogeneity. Impact
belongs to ordinal scale.
Total impact builds on impact. Since impact is of ordinal
scale, and total impact is calculated by aggregating impact
variables, the variables of total impact are also of ordinal
scale.
The CRAC++ method estimates ease of exploiting vulner-
abilities by calculating the ratio of number of capabilities
the attacker has over the number of capabilities required
for exploiting the vulnerability. There is an AND relation
among the owned capabilities and necessary capabilities.
That is if an attacker has all the necessary capabilities then
he can exploit the vulnerability and if he does not have all
capabilities then he still may but with a lower likelihood.
Furthermore, there is a positive geometric magnitude be-
tween the variables of ease of exploiting vulnerabilities. The
ease increases as the ratio of owned to necessary capabilities
increases. Thus, ease of exploiting a vulnerability is of type
ratio scale.
A further risk indicator is the ease of accessing one
component. This indicator belongs to the scale type ratio.
The last indicator that we analyze here is the protection
level of a component. This indicator is calculated by compar-
ing ease of accessing components for different threat agents.
Since ease of accessing one component belongs to scale type
ratio, so does this indicator.
We summarize these findings of Step 2 at Table III.
Table III
SCALES TYPES OF THE RISK INDICATORS OF CRAC++.
Risk Indicator Scale type possible values
I01: confidentiality value ordinal scale high–medium–low
I02: number of instances ordinal scale all–single–none
I03: homogeneity nominal scale homogeneous–
nonhomogeneous
I04: number of capabilities interval scale natural numbers
I05: number of conditions interval scale natural numbers
I06: level of mitigation ordinal scale 1/3–2/3–3/3
I07: impact ordinal scale null, high, medium,
low, very high
I08: total impact ordinal scale null, high, medium,
low, very high
I09: ease of exploiting vulner-
abilities
ratio scale positive rational
numbers
I10: ease of accessing one
component
ratio scale positive rational
numbers
I11: protection level of a com-
ponent
ratio scale positive rational
numbers
The next activity of Step 2 is analyzing how well each risk
indicator satisfies the four key characteristics (i.e. accuracy,
precision, validity and correctness). All risk indicators, ac-
cept confidentiality value (I01) and level of mitigation (I06),
obey the accuracy property. This is due to unavailability of
explicit information. However, if the variables are enough
coarse-grained then the chance of disagreement can be
minimized. There is space for human error only by deter-
mining (I10) the ease of accessing one component. There-
fore it doesn’t satisfy precision goal. I10 is determined by
comparing the ease of alternative attack propagation paths,
which are formed based on physical and logical connections
among IT components. If an existing logical connection is
over seen this may lead to missing a propagation path and
consequently achieving a wrong variable. Among the 11 risk
indicators CRAC++ uses only I07 and I08, impact and total
impact, do not satisfy the completeness goal. This is due to
the trade-off between cost of assessment and completeness.
The more complete a method is the longer it takes to
conduct it. CRAC++ addresses this trade-off by considering
only the confidentiality value of the information assets and
ignoring other measures that affect impact, e.g. loss of image
or penalties to be paid. Total impact is affected by this
optimization, because it is aggregated based on impact. All
of the indicators of CRAC++ satisfy the correctness goal.
This is due to the high level of formalization CRAC++
provides.
We summarize the results of this activity in Table IV. In
the table “+” indicates that the risk indicator satisfies this
characteristic and “-” indicates that the characteristic is not
satisfied.
Table IV
KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF RISK INDICATORS OF CRAC++.
Risk indicator A
cc
ur
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y
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n
C
om
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I01: confidentiality value - + + +
I02: number of instances + + + +
I03: homogeneity + + + +
I04: number of capabilities + + + +
I05: level of mitigation - + + +
I06: impact + + - +
I07: total impact + + - +
I08: ease of exploiting vulnerabilities + + + +
I09: ease of accessing one component + - + +
I10: protection level of a component + + + +
C. Analyzing Aggregation validity of CRAC++
In the following we discuss the meaningfulness of the
merge operators that are elicited at step 1. These operations
formalize the constructs validated at step 2. Due to page
limitations we can not present the formalizations here but the
interested reader may find them in the technical report [7].
Such formalizations aim to facilitate testing the aggradation
validity.
CRAC++ defines  operator to determine the impact. 
aggregates the number of instances and the confidentiality
values of the information asset, and formalizes impact.
Assuming that the entities of confidentiality value are high –
medium – low and the entities of number of instances are all
– single – non, the  operator behaves as shown in Table V.
Table V
BEHAVIOR OF THE  OPERATOR.
 Number of instancesall single none
Conf. value
high very-high high null
medium high medium null
low medium low null
We determined in step 2 that the variables of both con-
fidentiality values and number of instances are of ordinal
scale. To recall from Section II the ordinal scale preserves
order and is monotonic increasing. Since the  operator
satisfied these properties as well, we claim  is aggregation
valid.
CRAC++ aggregates total impact by incrementally ap-
plying the ⊕ operator on impact values until all available
information assets are considered. The behavior of ⊕ op-
erator with the impact values from Table V is presented in
Table VI. This operation formalizes the calculation of total
impact.
Table VI
BEHAVIOR OF THE ⊕ OPERATOR.
⊕ Impactvery-high high medium low null
Im
pa
ct
very-high very-high very-high very-high very-high very-high
high very-high very-high high high high
medium very-high high high medium medium
low very-high high medium medium low
null very-high high medium low null
The scale class of impact is ordinal and this scale pre-
serves order and is monotonic increasing. Since the ⊕
operator satisfied these properties as well, we clam ⊕ is
aggregation valid.
CRAC++ calculates ease of accessing one component by
first multiplying the ease of exploiting vulnerabilities of the
component with level of mitigation estimation, and then
applying the MAX operator on the achieved measurements.
The first aggregation is valid because both of the involved
constructs are of ratio scale and at this scale it is possible to
multiply the entities. The second aggregation is also valid
because it is applicable to variables with positive linear
magnitude, and the magnitude of ratio scale extends positive
linear magnitude.
A further construct that is calculated by applying the
MIN/MAX operator is the protection level of a component. It
is calculated by applying the MIN operator on the elements
of the set containing measurements of ease of accessing the
component for all threat agents. Since ratio scale extends
ordinal scale and monotonic increasing magnitude is a
property of ordinal scale, this operation is also valid.
V. RELATED WORK
Although meaningfulness of software measures is an-
alyzed by many researchers, e.g. [1], [3]–[5], analyzing
the validity of IT security risk measures is relatively new.
Research in this field focuses on how to define meaningfully
security measures, e.g. [4], and how to test their relevance
for IT security risk, e.g. [6], rather then how to validate the
measures proposed by available methods. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first approach that aims to validate
the meaningfulness of IT security risk indicators based on
measurement theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
We claim in an extended enterprise to prevent over invest-
ing in service level agreements or obtaining a contract that
provides a lower security level than the system requires, the
meaningfulness of risk indicators as well as merge operators
need to be validated based on measurement theory. Here, we
adapt approaches from the field of software engineering, e.g.
Fenton and Pfleeger [2], to IT security risk assessment, and
present a systematic method for validating model based risk
assessment methods.
Our analysis show that the fundamentals of measurement
theory is applicable to risk assessment (Q1). However, since
cost-efficiency and usability are two of the most important
success criteria of risk assessment, one may need to relax
down some of the meaningfulness-criteria, such as complete-
ness and precision.
We tested our validation method on CRAC++. Since, the
method provided formalizations of the risk indicators, it was
easy to apply the method. Although we think that for risk
assessment methods that provide a similar abstraction and
formalization level as CRAC++, to answer Q2 (repeatability)
further empirical research is necessary.
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